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Abstract
In Einstein’s physical geometry, the geometry of space and the uniformity of time are
taken to be non-conventional. However, due to the stipulation of the isotropy of the one-
way speed of light in the synchronization of clocks (or definition of simultaneity), as it
stands, Einstein’s views do not seem to apply to the whole of the Minkowski space-
time. In this work we will see how Einstein’s views can be applied to the Minkowski
space-time. In this way, when adopting Einstein’s views,  chronogeometry is a physical
chronogeometry.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this  work is  to show that  Einstein’s  views regarding geometry as a
practical or physical geometry1,  2 can be applied to the whole of the Minkowski space-
time.3 Contrary to Poincaré’s conventionalism, the Euclidean spatial geometry and the
uniform time are not conventional  according to Einstein.  However,  Einstein  did not
address the whole of the chronogeometry in this respect. In fact, to Einstein the notion
of coordinate time is related to a stipulation based on the “light postulate” (see, e.g.,
Einstein 1905, 141-2; Dieks 2010, 231-3). This might give the impression that the issue
of  the  conventionality  of  the  one-way  speed  of  light  (or  the  conventionality  of
simultaneity) is unrelated to the conventionality of geometry, and that, independently of
1  Einstein distinguishes axiomatic geometry from practical or physical geometry. We start with the idea
of  geometry  as  “pure”  mathematics:  “[Euclidean]  geometry  means  originally  only  the  essence  of
conclusions  from  geometric  axioms;  in  this  regard  it  has  no  physical  content”  (Einstein  1914,  78).
However,  geometry can be “amended” so that  it  becomes a physical  science:  “[Euclidean]  geometry
becomes a physical science by adding the statement that two points of a “rigid” body shall have a distinct
distance from each other that is independent of the position of the body” (Einstein 1914, 78). This leads to
the view that:  “After  this  amendment,  the theorems of  this amended [Euclidean]  geometry are  (in a
physical sense) either factually true or not true” (Einstein 1914, 78). In “geometry and experience”, from
1921, Einstein argues that more than “amended”, axiomatic geometry has to be “completed”. According
to Einstein, “geometry must be stripped of its merely logical-formal character by the coordination of real
objects  of  experience  with  the  empty  conceptual  schemata  of  axiomatic  geometry  …  Then  the
propositions of Euclid contain affirmations as to the behavior of practically-rigid bodies. (Einstein 1921a,
210-1).  In  this  way,   “geometry  thus  completed  is  evidently a  natural  science  … We will  call  this
completed geometry “practical geometry”” (Einstein 1921a, 211). 
2  Instead of using the term “practical geometry” we will adopt, following Paty (1992), the term “physical
geometry”. In our view it gives a more direct sense of Einstein’s view of geometry as a physical science,
or,  using his  words,  as  “the  most  ancient  branch  of  physics”  (Einstein 1921a,  211).  Also,  the  term
“physical geometry” gives a more direct sense of the very direct relation of geometry and experimental
measurements,  since it  is a physical  science with a clear experimental  counterpart.  Accordingly,  “ the
concept of distance corresponds to something that can be experienced. Geometry then contains statements
about possible experiments; it is a physical science directly subjected to experimental testing” (Einstein
1924, 326).
3 This work is circumscribed  to this objective.  It  is  not  an argument  to endorse Einstein’s views on
geometry. It is important to notice that Einstein considers that his idea of practical or physical geometry
applies to the “practical geometry of Riemann, and therefore the general theory of relativity” (Einstein
1921a, 213).  The semi-Riemannian space-time is locally Minkowskian. This means that if  we cannot
apply Einstein’’s views to the Minkowski space-time we also cannot apply them in the context of general
relativity.
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this,  Einstein’s  views  on  geometry  do  not  apply  to  the  totality  of  the  geometrical
structure of the theory. 
In  part  2,  we  will  review  Einstein’s  version  of  Poincaré’s  conventionality  of
geometry and see why Einstein considers that the spatial geometry and the uniform time
are not conventional.  In part  3,  we will  see that  the conventionality of the one-way
speed of light is a case of Einstein’s conventionality of geometry. In this situation we
would be facing a conundrum. On one side, Einstein argues that the spatial Euclidean
geometry and the uniform time are non-conventional. On the other side, the whole of
the Minkowski  space-time would have a  conventional  element,  since the  light  cone
structure (corresponding to a particular definition of the one-way speed of light) – or,
equivalently,  the determination of the coordinate time – would be conventional. This
would mean, after all, that in part the geometrical structure of the theory is determined
conventionally.  In part 4, we will see that Einstein’s views on geometry as physical
geometry can be extended to the whole of the Minkowski space-time. We will consider
a synchronization procedure that does not rely on light propagation, which is necessary
if we want to consider derivations of the Lorentz transformations that do not depend on
the  “light  postulate”.  By  taking  into  account  Einstein’s  views  related  to  the  non-
conventionality of the (spatial) Euclidean space and the uniform time, it is possible to
show  that  this  synchronization  procedure  does  not  have  any  implicit  conventional
element.4 This leads to a non-conventional coordinate time, which implies that, when
adopting  Einstein’s  view  of  geometry  as  physical  geometry,  the  whole  of  the
chronogeometry is non-conventional. 
2. Einstein and the non-conventionality of geometry and uniform time
Let  us  consider  a  gedanken  experiment:  we  take  several  (straight)  rods  that
experimentally are always  congruent (i.e.  rods that when compared always have the
same length).5 Let us consider the disposition (placement) of the rods within an inertial
reference frame,6 making for example identical  planar figures. These figures are the
4  As we will see in section 4, the synchronization procedure being considered, which falls in the category
of synchronization by clock transport, is non-conventional in a, certainly for some, philosophically weak
sense that does not contradicts the conventionalists criticism of similar synchronization procedures: if we
take the philosophical stance that the length congruence and the time interval congruence are physical and
non-conventional in Einstein’s sense, then it follows that distant simultaneity is also physical and non-
conventional (which can be shown by adopting a clock transport synchronization procedure). 
5  We can even consider these rods to give our adopted metrological unit of length. In fact, the unit of
length  was metrologically defined in terms of  a  platinum-iridium bar until  1960 (see,  e.g.,  Giacomo
1984).
6  As Barbour mentioned, “Einstein never gave much serious thought to the issue of the determination of
inertial frames of reference” (Barbour 2007, 588). In fact, according to Einstein, “[we assume] that an
observer attached to a coordinate system is able to determine by experiment whether the system is or is
not  in  accelerated  motion”  (Einstein  1910,  123).  More  than  this,  Einstein  basically  gave  cursory
definitions of  inertial  reference frames,  in terms similar  to that  of classical  mechanics.  According to
Einstein,  “[special  relativity]  takes  from earlier  physics  the  assumption  of  the  validity  of  Euclidean
geometry for the possible positions of rigid bodies, the inertial frame, and the law of inertia” (Einstein
1923, 76). In this way, “the inertial frame and time in classical mechanics are best defined together by a
suitable formulation of the law of inertia: It is possible to determine time in such a way and to assign to
the coordinate system such a state of motion (inertial frame) that, with reference to the latter, force-free
material points undergo no acceleration” (Einstein 1923, 75). Another definition along these lines is: “it is
possible to choose a [inertial reference frame] that is in such a state of motion that every freely moving
material point moves rectilinearly and uniformly relative to it” (Einstein 1915, 249). 
For the purpose of this work we will address briefly two issues.  As it  is,  these “definitions” of
inertial  reference  frame  seem  to  be  inconsistent  in  the  context  of  special  relativity  (that  they  are
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same (congruent) independently of the chosen plane and their position and orientation in
the plane.  We find out that  the placement  of the rods corresponds to  the Euclidean
geometry when identifying the rods with line segments.
According  to  Poincaré  this  conclusion  would  be  wrong.  In  his  view  the
(mathematical)  congruences  in  a  geometrical  space  can  be  such  that  correspond  to
Euclidean geometry or, e.g., Lobatschewsky’s geometry (Poincaré 1902, 92-3). There is
in Poincaré’s view no relation between the concrete material congruence that one can
observe and the congruence of geometrical figures. In particular, one cannot relate a
concrete material congruence to a mathematical congruence (see, e.g., Paty 1992, 11).
Experimentation  does  not  preclude  any geometry,  since  a  theory  of  physics  can  be
reformulated when changing the adopted geometry in a way that it  still  agrees with
experimental  results.  This  does  not  mean  that  to  Poincaré  geometry  and  physical
theories are on an equal footing. As Paty writes, to Poincaré there is no interdependence
of  geometry  and  physical  theory,  what  we  have  is  “a  dependence  of  the  physical
formulation on the geometrical definitions” (Paty 1992, 12).
To Einstein, even if Poincaré’s ideas are appealing,  the special and general theories
of  relativity  do  not  conform to  the  conventionality  of  geometry  (see,  e.g.,  Einstein
1921a;  Einstein  1949b,  685-6).  In  this  way,  in  the present  stage of development  of
physics,  it is necessary to “overrun” provisionally geometric conventionalism, even if,
according to Einstein,  conventionalism is ultimately the “right” philosophical position
(see, e.g.,  Einstein 1949b; Paty 1993, 300-7; Friedman 2002, 200-1; Ryckman 2005,
section 3.3; see also Giovanelli 2014). To Einstein, Euclidean geometry is not, like to
Poincaré, an abstract geometry (i.e. pure mathematics), it is a practical geometry: the
geometry of the disposition (placement) of practically rigid bodies (that are, implicitly,
inertial). As such it is a physical science.7 The crucial point that warrants this view of
geometry as physical  geometry,  is  Einstein’s  realization that,  at  the present stage of
incomplete has been noticed by Torretti (1983, 51)). One is defining the inertial reference frame using the
law of inertia. However, the law of inertia, in its standard formulation, seems to require first a definition
of distant simultaneity in the inertial reference frame (see also footnotes 11, 12, and 17). To say that a free
body travels equal distances in equal times presupposes the synchronization of the clocks of the reference
frame that will measure the time gone by the free body when moving rectilinearly. But to synchronize the
clocks we first consider them to be part of the inertial reference frame (see, e.g, Einstein 1905, 141-2;
Einstein 1907, 255-7; Einstein 1910, 125-8). It seems that we would have a circularity in this definition.
This can be avoided, following Einstein’s own views, by defining the inertial reference frame in relation
to the rectilinear motion of free bodies and the rectilinear propagation of light rays (Torretti 1983, 51-2).
This avoids, at this point, any mention to the uniformity of time, as it is made in the law of inertia. The
“inertial motion” is just characterized, e.g., in terms of the rectilinear motion of free bodies (without any
reference to the uniformity of time). The other aspect we want to mention is that these definitions rely on
the notion of free body (“force-free material points”). It seems that we are relying on a notion that is only
meaningful in the context of the whole theory, after dynamics is developed. In a way similar to Friedman
(1983, 118) we can make the case that the early reference to the notion of “free body” is not inconsistent,
since the theory in its completion provides,  so to speak, a self-consistent improved or complemented
definition, in which a free body is characterized as a body not subjected to (dynamical) interactions. The
early reference to “free body” in the context of the definition of inertial reference frame is consistent with
the notion of free body arising from the whole theory, i.e. the theory enables a meaningful notion of free
body (in particular  in the case  of special  relativity it  is  a body not subjected to any electromagnetic
interaction or applied forces). We have however to be careful, when referring to “free body” in its early
elusive meaning, not to presume aspects that are only meaningful in the context of the whole theory (see
also footnote 23).
7  As Einstein mentions, Poincaré takes the fact that real solid bodies in nature are not rigid to advocate
for a view of geometry in which geometrical objects do not correspond to real bodies (Einstein 1921a,
212). As Paty stresses, “geometry, in Poincaré’s conception is completely disconnected from measurable
properties of physical bodies” (Paty 1992, 11). However, as Einstein calls the attention to, “it is not a
difficult task to determine the physical state of a measuring-rod so accurately that its behaviour relatively
to other measuring-bodies shall be sufficiently free from ambiguity to allow it to be substituted for the
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development of mathematical physics, the notion of rod (like the notion of clock) enters
the theory’s construction as an independent concept that is theoretically self-sufficient,
and not as a complex physical system that is described by the theory (see, e.g., Einstein
1921a, 212-3; Einstein 1949a, 59-61; see also Giovanelli 2014). Einstein considers that
ideally  mathematical  physics  should  be  constructed  in  accordance  to  Poincaré’s
conventionalism;8 let  us  say,  by  adopting  a  simple  geometry  G  (e.g.  Euclidean
geometry) on top of which the physical theory P is built. The rods should not be related
directly to G but to G + P, e.g. as a solution of mathematical equations. In Einstein’s
reinterpretation of Poincaré’s conventionality of geometry (see, e.g., Paty 1992, 7-8),
one  could  choose  a  different  geometry  Gnew that  when  taken  together  with  a
reformulation of the physics Pref would give exactly the same prediction of experimental
results. Using mathematical symbols in a heuristic way the idea is that G + P = Gnew +
Pref  (Einstein 1921a, 236).
Einstein calls the attention to the fact that what should be a theoretical construct
enters the theory as a self-sufficient concept already at the level of a physical geometry
Gp,  since  it  is  established  a  correspondence  between  the  concrete  rod  and  a
mathematical element of length dr (see, e.g., Einstein 1913b, 157; Einstein 1949a, 71;
Einstein  1922,  322-3).  In  this  way,  the  issue  of  what  is  the  appropriate  geometry
becomes  an experimental  matter.  One finds  out  that,  in  the  case  of  rods  in  inertial
motion,  the  experimental  laws  of  disposition  of  rods  correspond  to  the  Euclidean
geometry.9
Equivalently to the case of the conventionality of geometry there is the view that in
chronometry  (as  mathematically  conceived),  there  is  a  freedom to  adopt  or  not  the
equality (congruence) of consecutive time intervals.10 As Poincaré called the attention
to, experimentally there is no way to determine if two consecutive time intervals are
identical (Poincaré 1898, 2-3). In this way the adoption of a uniform time (in which we
take successive time intervals to be equal) would be conventional.11
There seems to be also a freedom to stipulate how we might consider distant clocks
(of the same inertial  reference frame) to give the same time reading simultaneously.
This  was  notice,  e.g.,  by  Poincaré,  who  mentioned  that  “we  have  not  even  direct
intuition of the simultaneity of two [distant] events” (Poincaré 1902, 111). This means,
in the context of special relativity, that when synchronizing distant clocks of an inertial
reference frame, e.g., by adopting the Poincaré-Einstein synchronization procedure in
terms  of  the  exchange  of  light  signals  (see,  e.g.,  Darrigol  2005),  one  would  be
implementing a convention.  In fact  in Poincaré’s view, one “admits  that light  has a
constant velocity, and in particular that this velocity is the same in all directions. This is
“rigid” body. It is to measuring-bodies of this kind that statements as to rigid bodies must be referred”
(Einstein 1921a, 237).
8  According to Howard (2014), Einstein’s view that a “completed fundamental theory” would be such
that conforms to the conventionality of geometry is much more the view that such a theory conforms to
Duhemian holism (see also Ryckman 2005, section 3.3).
9  In Einstein’s words, “solid bodies are related, with respect to their possible dispositions, as are bodies in
Euclidean geometry of three dimensions” (Einstein 1921a, 235).
10  In this work we treat at an equal footing the physical space (interval) congruence and physical time
(interval) congruence, which is the natural thing to do when adopting Einstein’s views (see, e.g., Einstein
1921a; Giovanelli 2014; Ryckman 2005, section 3.3). In the case of conventionalist accounts we also find
authors that also treat the conventional space and time congruences at the same level (see, e.g., Grünbaum
1968).
11  That there might be something conventional in the notion of uniform time, which, e.g.,  is part  of
Newton’s notion of absolute time, is something recurrent in treatments of the law of inertia. For example,
d’Alembert considered that the rectilinearity of the inertial motion is observable while its uniformity is
not (nevertheless being possible to deduce it), Neumann simply postulated, like Newton, the uniformity of
time, and Lange considered that the law of inertia has conventional elements in it (see, e.g., Coelho 2007).
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a postulate without which no measure of this velocity can be tried” (Poincaré 1898, 11).
This would imply that there would be a conventional element in the determination of the
coordinate time.
In terms of Einstein’s approach to the conventionality of geometry, when adopting
different chronometries by choosing a different congruence relation between successive
time  intervals  and/or  a  different  synchrony  convention  (in  case  we  can  see  this
convention as a case of geometrical convention), the differences in the chronometries
can be compensated for by a change in the physical part of the theory. The different
versions of the theory would by experimentally indistinguishable.
Any dynamical system (inertial or not) or group of dynamical systems in interaction
(constituting an “isolated” system) can be used as a clock since from their motion (or
motions) we can determine a time variable that corresponds to the inertial time scale.
One  example  of  this  is  the  determination  of  the  so-called  ephemeris  time,  which
corresponds to the inertial time (Barbour 2009).12 More straightforward examples are
the inertial motion of free bodies, the rotation of the Earth (taken to be uniform), and so
on (Reichenbach 1927, 117). Besides relying on dynamical systems corresponding to
the inertial time scale there seems to be two other methods of time reckoning, which
might be considered independent in the present stage of development of physics: light
clocks and atomic (natural) clocks (Reichenbach 1927, 117). As Reichenbach called the
attention to, “it is an empirical fact that these three [methods] lead to the same measure
of [time]” (Reichenbach 1927, 117).
Regarding light clocks, it is not clear that we might consider them as related to a
time scale independent from an “underlying” time scale. A light clock can be idealized,
e.g., as two mirrors with light bouncing between them. There are simple models of light
clocks in which they are independent of the particularities of matter (Ohanian 1976,
192-3).13 These  models  can  be  seen  ultimately  as  relying  on  Maxwell-Lorentz
electrodynamics, in this way depending on the coordinate time of an inertial reference
frame.14
A different  situation seems to arise with atomic clocks  (atoms).  Being made of
matter, an atomic clock can be in inertial or non-inertial motion. As such, it might be the
case that, from its motion we might “retrace” the inertial time. However it is clear that
there is something more: atoms emit and absorb radiation at particular frequencies –
12  According to the law of inertia (which is part both of classical mechanics and the “completed” theory
of special relativity), equal times are those in which a free body, moving in relation to any adopted inertial
body of reference, travels equal distances.  The free body becomes a clock giving, in Lange’s words, the
inertial time scale (see, e.g., Torretti 1983, 16-7). For an analysis, in the context of classical mechanics, of
the related issues of the role of the law of inertia in the definition of an inertial reference frame, the
definition of the time scale, and its dependence on the notion of free body, see, e.g., Barbour (1989, 645-
88); Barbour (2007, 578-89), Torretti (1983, 9-20), DiSalle (1990, 140-1), DiSalle (2009). The situation
in special  relativity might be more complex, since following Einstein we might  need to consider the
clocks of an inertial reference frame as atomic clocks giving the atomic time scale (see main text). The
relation between these two time scales in the foundation of the theory is unclear. We will consider that it
might still make sense in special relativity to speak of inertial time in relation to a free body or to address
the ephemeris time as an inertial time. As we will see in the two final paragraphs of this section (and
footnote  19)  this  does  not  seem  to  bear  on  Einstein’s  reasons  for  taking  time  to  be  uniform  non-
conventionally.
13  In fact, the light clock can be described in a very general way in terms of light bouncing between free
particles.  These  are  described  in  terms  of  timelike  geodesics  of  the  Minkowski  space-time  (which
correspond to an inertial motion), while the light is described simply in terms of null worldlines (Ohanian
1976, 192-5; see also Fletcher 2015).
14  As mentioned in footnote 12, it might not seem possible to identify the coordinate time with an inertial
time. Adopting Einstein’s views the coordinate time is determined by the atomic time (see main text).
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each  have  a  particular  “signature”  of  spectral  lines  (atomic  spectra).  According  to
Einstein:
Since the oscillatory phenomena that produces a spectral line must be viewed as intra-
atomic phenomena whose frequencies are uniquely determined by the nature of the ions
[(atoms)], we can use these ions [(atoms)] as clocks. (Einstein 1910, 124-5)
The “intra-atomic phenomena” of atoms enable another method of time reckoning. This
gives rise to a new time scale based on a metrological definition of the second in terms
of the “internal oscillations” of cesium atoms (Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 53-
61). Experimentally,  the atomic time of atomic clocks is universal, i.e. shared by all
atomic systems. Also, it turns out that, the inertial time scale and the atomic time scale
coincide.  When  comparing  the  rates  of  an  atomic  clock  and  an  “ephemeris  clock”
(defined  in  terms  of  the  motions  of  celestial  bodies),  the  deviation  between  the
clocks/scales is less than 2 x 10–10 per year (Ohanian 1976, 187-8).  However, this does
not  mean  that  we can  consider  the  two  time  scales  to  be  identical,  i.e.  we cannot
consider that an atomic clock is merely one particular type of “inertial clock”, since in
relation to its “intra-atomic phenomena” it is not described as a dynamical system in the
context of special relativity.  The “intra-atomic phenomena” giving rise to the atomic
time lies outside the domain of application of the theory. In fact, even general relativity
does not provide a field theory of matter, which might describe the “workings” of atoms
– whose best description at the present time is given by quantum mechanics. Already by
1925,  while  working  on  a  tentative  unified  field  theory,  Einstein  wrote  regarding
general relativity that he became “convinced that Rik  – gikR/4 =  Tik is not the right
thing” (Einstein 1925, 449). Einstein expected to be able to develop an extension of the
theory  unifying  gravitation  and  electromagnetism  and  eventually  providing  a  field
description of matter (including the elusive quantum aspects. See, e.g., Goenner 2004).
An atom (a clock) is not described as a solution of general relativity or special relativity.
According to Einstein:
[The concepts of rod and clock] must still be employed as independent concepts; for we
are still  far  from possessing such certain knowledge of  the theoretical  principles  of
atomic structure as to be able to construct solid bodies and clocks theoretically from
elementary concepts. (Einstein 1921a, 213)15 
The independence of the atomic time scale from the inertial time scale enables us to
take the time coordinate of an inertial reference frame as defined in terms of the atomic
time: the conceptual change from the inertial time scale to the atomic time scale, which
is experimentally justified by the identity of the scales, results from considering the
clocks of the inertial reference frame directly as atomic clocks (see, e.g., Einstein 1907,
263; Einstein 1910, 134).16 
15  In relation to this issue we must notice that to Einstein, e.g. a light clock could not be taken to represent
the concept of clock as a solution of the theory in the sense given by him. While Einstein mentioned light
clocks and other type of “inertial clocks” (see, e.g., Einstein 1911, 344; Einstein 1913a, 207), which at
first sight we might take to be described by special relativity, the theory does not provides a theory of
matter.  We might  speculate  that  from Einstein’s  point  of  view we  might  consider  that  more  than  a
dynamical  theory  of  light  clocks,  what  we  have,  as  mentioned  above,  are  “just”  simplified  models
consisting in timelike worldlines taken to represent mirrors and null worldlines representing light rays. 
16  In fact, in the actuality the time scale adopted is not the inertial time scale but the atomic time scale. It
turns out that atomic clocks are much more accurate and practical than, e.g., the implementation of the
inertial time scale in terms of the ephemeris time, which is based on astronomical observations (see, e.g.,
Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 110).
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Regarding the atomic time scale given by atomic clocks, it might seem that it is
possible to make a conventional choice of the time congruence. Since the atomic time is
common to all atomic systems,  one might choose a time congruence corresponding,
e.g., to a non-uniform time (making also a change in the physical part of the theory).
Adopting  Einstein’s  views  this  is  not  the  case.  To adopt  a  conventionalist  position
regarding the uniformity of time,   clocks  as  physical  systems must  be described as
solutions of G + P. This is not the case in special or general relativity.  According to
Einstein, clocks (and rods) are not  “represented as solutions of the basic equations”
(Einstein 1949a, 59-61). As mentioned, in the theory, clocks (and rods) are treated as
“theoretically self-sufficient entities” (Einstein 1949a, 59-61). In fact, clocks and rods,
as independent self-sufficient concepts, are related directly to the chronogeometry, or
more precisely to the line element ds =  – dx2 – dy2 – dz2 + c2dt2 of the Minkowski
space-time. According to Einstein:
the quantity [ds] which is directly measurable by our unit measuring-rods and clocks …
is therefore a uniquely determinate invariant for two neighboring events (points in the
four-dimensional  continuum),  provided that we use measuring-rods that are equal  to
each other when brought together and superimposed, and clocks whose rates are the
same when they are brought together. In this the physical assumption is essential that
the  relative  lengths  of  two measuring-rods  and the  relative  rates  of  two clocks  are
independent,  in  principle,  of  their  previous  history.  (Einstein  1922,  323;  see  also
Einstein 1921a, 213-4; Einstein 1921b, 225; Einstein 1918a, 529)
Atomic clocks do exactly that. As Einstein wrote in a letter to Weyl:
If light rays were the only means of establishing empirically the metric conditions in the
vicinity of a space-time point, a factor would indeed remain undefined in the distance ds
(as  well  as  in  the  gµν’s).  This  indefiniteness  would  not  exist,  however,  if  the
measurement  results  gained  from  (infinitesimal)  rigid  bodies  (measuring  rods)  and
clocks are used in the definition of ds. A timelike ds can then be measured directly
through a standard clock whose world line contains ds.
Such a definition for the elementary distance ds would only become illusory if the
concepts “standard measuring rod” and “standard clock” were based on a principally
false assumption. This would be the case if the length of a standard measuring rod (or
the rate of a standard clock) depended on its prehistory. If this really were the case in
nature, then no chemical elements with spectral lines of a specific frequency could exist,
but rather the relative frequencies of two (spatially adjacent) atoms of the same sort
would, in general, have to differ. (Einstein 1918b, 533)
The  two issues,  the  assumption  of  the  independence  from the  past  history  and  the
privileged position in the theory of the concepts of measuring rod and measuring clock
are linked together and sustained by the existence of atoms. Two atoms of the same
chemical element always have the same spectral line when side by side, independently
of their past history – they are stable. As such, the atoms, which are not described as a
complex  solution  of  special  or  general  relativity,  provide  a  standard  for  time  (and
length) that can be used in the physical interpretation of the invariant ds (and in the
physical justification of this invariance).
At this point we can apply to the case of (part of the) chronometry an argument
equivalent  to  Einstein’s  argument  for  taking  Euclidean  geometry  to  be  a  physical
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geometry. Like the rod is “transcribed” into the theory as the spatial element dx, dy, or
dz (to simplify we will consider a generic dr), the clock is associated directly with a
time element dt at a point:  “the time difference t2 – t1 of two events taking place at the
same point of the coordinate system can be measured directly by a clock (of identical
construction for all points) set up at this point” (Einstein 1915, 262). In the same way
that we identify dr directly with the length of a rod, which “fixes” the (spatial) geometry
non-conventionally,  we  identify  dt  directly  with  the  reading  of  an  atomic  clock,
implying a non-conventional uniform time. 
There is however an oversimplification on Einstein’s part regarding this issue. In
relation  to  the  line  element  ds2 =  c2dt2 –  dr2,  Einstein  mentions  that  it  is  “directly
measurable by our unit measuring rods and clocks” (Einstein 1922, 323). This statement
is general enough to be correct even if it is not being spelled out an important point
regarding  time  intervals:  only  when considering  a  particular  location  in  the  inertial
reference frame is dt associated to a measurement made by just one clock. However, in
several places, Einstein writes statements like the following: “[dr] is measured directly
by a measuring rod and [dt] by a clock at rest relatively to the system” (Einstein 1922,
351; Einstein 1913a, 211; Einstein 1914, 33).  Only when dr = 0 is dt associated to a
measurement made by just one clock. In general, when dr  ≠ 0, dt must be related to
measurements made by two clocks. In this case we are dealing with the coordinate time
and, e.g. adopting Einstein’s approach, the synchronization of clocks must be taken into
account.
In relation to the first case (dr = 0) we can adopt Einstein’s views and consider a
theoretically self-sufficient conceptual clock as the counterpart of the concrete atomic
clock. In this way, we can identify the time element dt (with dr = 0) directly with the
time measurement of an atomic clock. According to Einstein, this situation precludes
any conventionality in the mathematical congruence of successive dt (with dr = 0; i.e.
corresponding to the same clock, but valid for all clocks), and the uniformity of time
follows. However, this is not enough to make a case for a physical chronogeometry,
since  in  the  chronometric  part  of  the  chronogeometry G is  “included” not  only the
congruence of successive time intervals but also the setting of the notion of same-time-
at-a-distance,  i.e.  the  synchrony  of  distant  clocks.  Einstein  did  not  mention,  in  the
context of his writings on physical  geometry,  if this relation might  be set in a non-
conventional way. Right now, based on Einstein’s arguments, we can only consider that
the (local) atomic time is taken to be uniform non-conventionally. We cannot arrive at
the same conclusion regarding the coordinate time.17
When considering  the case of the inertial  time scale,  Einstein’s  argument  for a
physical uniform time seems not to apply. It seems that we do not need an independent,
theoretically self-sufficient, concept – the clock – in this case. Time is already being
expressed  directly  in  the  motions  – e.g.  as  the  ephemeris  time.  As mentioned,  any
dynamical  system, be it  an inertial  body or e.g.,  a mechanical clock, has its  motion
described in terms of the inertial time, at least in classical mechanics. If this also holds
in special relativity (even if partially), this might mean that from the motion(s) of some
dynamical system one could determine the inertial time. The existence of the inertial
time would be already “implemented” in the theory without the need of any further
17  At this point it is still unclear the exact meaning of the “uniformity” of the inertial motion in the law of
inertia, since so far we have not considered how the synchronization of clocks might affect the form of
the law of inertia. If it turns out that the synchronization is a conventional element in the mathematical
structure of the theory G, then, according to Einstein’s views, the physical part, including the law of
inertia, might be affected by the implementation of a different Gnew due to the adoption of a different
synchronization procedure.
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concept like “clock” – at least not as an independent concept.18 In this approach the time
congruence is not settled. 
We could be facing a puzzling situation here. If we develop special relativity in
terms of the inertial time scale without taking into account the atomic time scale (and
for the sake of the argument we will take for granted that this can be done), we arrive at
least at one conventional element in the time scale: the congruence of successive time
intervals. By adopting Einstein’s approach we arrive at a non-conventional uniform time
scale (for each clock individually; not for the time coordinate of the inertial reference
frame, for which it is necessary to take into account the synchronization of the clocks).
Since in the present stage of development of physics these time scales are at least to
some point independent, this seems to be a possibility.  However, experimentally,  we
already know that the time scales are identical. If the congruence of successive time
intervals  is not conventional  in the case of the atomic time then we are not free to
choose conventionally the time congruence of the inertial time.19
3.  The  conventionality  of  simultaneity  as  a  case  of  Einstein’s  version  of  the
conventionality of geometry 
In Einstein’s approach, the “light postulate” is an essential element in the deduction of
the Lorentz transformations. According to Einstein, Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics
implies that there is at least one inertial reference frame in which light propagates with a
velocity  c that  is  independent  of  the motion  of  the emitting  body.  This  “postulate”
together  with the principle  of relativity  implies  according to  Einstein that  light  also
propagates with velocity c in any other inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Einstein 1905;
Einstein 1912-1914, 21-2; see also Brown and Maia 1993). One way in which Einstein
arrives at the Lorentz transformations is by considering the equations describing the
propagation of a spherical wave in two inertial reference frames in relative motion. The
equations have the same form (with the same constant  c) in the two inertial reference
frames. From these equations Einstein deduces the Lorentz transformations (see, e.g.,
Einstein 1907).
The propagation of light enters Einstein’s approach at an even more basic level, that
of determining the time coordinate of an inertial reference frame. According to Einstein,
to “spread” time in an inertial reference frame it is necessary to synchronize (i.e. set the
phase  of)  identical  clocks  of  the  inertial  reference  frame.  Like  Poincaré,  Einstein
proposes  a  protocol  to  synchronize  the  clocks  based  on  the  propagation  of  light,
according to which “the “time” needed for the light to travel from A to B is equal to the
“time” it needs to travel from B to A” (Einstein 1905, 142).
18  A  (inertial)  clock  could  be  in  this  case  a  dynamical  system  that  “manifests”  or  is  “lock  onto”
dynamically described processes (motions) “directly and exclusively governed by the local inertial frame
of reference” (Barbour 2007, 581; see also Barbour 2009).    
19  In  this part  we are rephrasing Einstein’s views in terms of the atomic time scale.  While Einstein
explicitly associated the notion of conceptual clock to that of atomic clocks (see, e.g., Einstein 1918b,
533; Einstein 1921a, 214; see also Giovanelli 2014),  obviously he did not develop his views in terms of
the related atomic time scale, only established in 1967 (see, e.g. Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 110).
Also,  since  when adopting Einstein’s  views,  we need  clocks  to  give  a  physical  meaning to  the line
element, in the context of special relativity the idea of an inertial time scale developed independently of
any notion of clock does not seem to be feasible. Going a bit beyond the scope of this work we have tried
to show the plausibility that even if this was the case it might still be possible to endorse Einstein’s view
of a physical time congruence. However this is not strictly necessary for the purpose of this work, which
as mentioned is simply to explore the possibility of extending, within Einstein’s physical geometry, the
physical space congruence and physical time congruence to establish a physical distant simultaneity. 
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Einstein’s approach leads to the view that there is an element of conventionality in
the synchronization procedure. This approach is supposed to suffer from a problem of
circularity: to have clocks in phase in an inertial reference frame we need to exchange
light signals. It is presupposed that the speed of light in each direction (the one-way
speed of light) is the same. However the determination of the one-way speed of light is
only possible after we have a time coordinate associated to the inertial reference frame
(in Einstein’s terms, after we set the phase of the clocks). This situation leads to the
view that  the  equality  of the one-way speed of  light  in  different  directions  and the
synchronization of distant clocks of an inertial reference frame is a matter of convention
(see, e.g., Anderson, Vetharaniam, and Stedman, 1998, 96).
There is a view according to which a synchronization procedure presupposing an
anisotropic  speed of light  (i.e.  a different  one-way speed of  light  depending on the
direction)  corresponds to a  coordinate  system different  from the one arising from a
synchronization in which one adopts the convention of an isotropic speed of light. That
is, different synchronization conventions correspond to a recoordinatization within the
same inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Weingard 1985; Giannoni 1978, 23). Since any
physical theory can be formulated in a generally covariant way, one might have the
impression that  the so-called conventionality  of the one-way speed of light  is  but a
trivial example of general covariance (see, e.g., Norton 1992). 
A  somewhat  different  way  to  look  at  this  situation  is  to  take  the  choice  of  a
different one-way speed of light (and corresponding coordinate system) as an example
of  a  gauge freedom in  special  relativity.  Some authors  mention  the  gauge freedom
simply  as  meaning  the  possibility  of  a  recoordinatization  (see,  e.g.,  Anderson,
Vetharaniam, and Stedman,  1998, 98).  It is  simply a different  way to say the same
thing. However, there are different interpretations of gauge freedom that go beyond that.
According to Rynasiewicz (2012), in simple terms, the Minkowski space-time is only
determined  up  to  a  diffeormophism  of  the  metric.  What  this  means  is  that  the
Minkowski space-time does not have a defined light cone structure; depending on the
stipulation of the one-way speed of light there is a tilting of the light cone (Rynasiewicz
2012, 92; see also Edwards 1963). These different light cone structures are physically
equivalent and correspond to different conventional choices of a criterion for distant
simultaneity.  In  Rynasiewicz’s  view this  situation  does  not  correspond to a  passive
transformation  of  the  coordinate  system  of  the  Minkoswki  space-time  to  another
coordinate  system.  What  we  have  is  an  active  transformation  of  the  “Minkoswki
spacetime to a new Minkoswki spacetime” (Rynasiewicz 2012, 93). Thinking about the
Minkoswki space-time in terms of a manifold E4 in which is defined a metric η, when
applying a diffeomorphism d to the Minkoswki space-time  〈E4,  η〉, one is so to speak
implementing  a  new  Minkoswki  space-time  〈E4,  d*η〉.  We  can  say  that  the
diffeomorphisms “comprise the gauge freedom” of the theory (see,  e.g.  Wald 1984,
438)
At  this  point  one  might  think  that  this  situation  is  different  from the  so-called
conventionality  of  geometry.  We  will  see  next  that  this  is  not  the  case.  Adopting
Einstein’s view in terms of a physical geometry, the space and time congruences are the
ones corresponding to the homogeneous and isotropic case (i.e. the spatial Euclidean
geometry  and  the  uniform  time).  This  might  give  the  impression  that  the
chronogeometry is settled, and that when adopting a different synchrony convention one
is simply changing the coordinate system. However to make a recoordinatization one
needs a coordinate system in the first place. The conventional choice of the one-way
speed of  light  does  not  enter  at  the level  of  changing from a coordinate  system to
another, but in setting up the coordinate system in the first place. To have a global time
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coordinate it is necessary to relate in a meaningful way the time reading at different
spatial locations of the inertial reference frame. In Einstein’s terms, we are considering
identical clocks (i.e. clocks that have the same rate), which correspond mathematically
to congruent time intervals for each clock (i.e. to a uniform time). At this point it is not
yet settled the relation between their phases (i.e. the clocks are not yet synchronized and
because  of  this  one  does  not  have  a  global  time  coordinate  defined  in  the  inertial
reference  frame).  In  Einstein’s  approach,  the time coordinate  (that  he also calls  the
physical time) is determined by the synchronization procedure (see, e.g., Einstein 1910,
125-8).  If  this  procedure  is  a  conventional  choice  then  it  is  the  chronogeometry
associated to the inertial reference frame that is being chosen conventionally.
This sheds new light on the view of the setting of the one-way speed of light as an
example of gauge freedom of the theory. The gauge freedom of the theory arises from
the  possibility  of  choosing  different  metrics  (that  are  transformable  via  a
diffeomorphism into  the  Lorentz  metric),  i.e.  the  setting  of  different  but  physically
equivalent  geometries.  As such the  gauge freedom refers  to  something  prior  to  the
recoordinatization; it is related to a partial freedom in implementing a coordinate system
prior to any change to another coordinate system. In this way, what Rynasiewicz calls
the  active  transformation  of  a  Minkowski  space-time  with  a  metric  η into  a  new
Minkowski space-time with a metric d*η, results from the “gauge freedom” of having
the possibility of choosing different initial settings of the distant simultaneity relation in
an inertial reference frame, which corresponds to different choices/implementations of a
Minkowskian  chronogeometry.20 The  difference  between  these  geometries  is  in  the
stipulation of different one-way speeds of light. 
Let us recall, at this point, Einstein’s version of the conventionality of geometry,
which we mentioned in section 2. According to Einstein: 
Geometry (G) predicates nothing about the behavior of real things, but only geometry
together with the totality (P) of physical laws can do so. Using symbols, we may say
that only the sum of (G) + (P) is subject to experimental verification. Thus (G) may be
chosen arbitrarily,  and also parts  of  (P).  All  these laws are conventions.  All  that  is
necessary to avoid contradictions is to chose the remainder of (P) so that (G) and the
whole of (P) are together in accord with experience. (Einstein 1921a, 212)
The conventionality in the synchronization procedure – or gauge freedom in the setting
of the metric, leads to physically equivalent isotropic or anisotropic Minkowski space-
times,  〈E4,  η〉 or <E4,  η'>  =  〈Ε4, δ∗η〉.  The  difference  is  in  the  adopted  isotropy or
anisotropy of the one-way speed of light. How does the change in G affects the physical
part P? This issue has been addressed (not in these terms) by, e.g., Edwards (1963),
20  There are other authors that, from a different perspective, implicitly, make of the conventionality of
distant  simultaneity  a  case  of  conventionality  of  geometry.   In  these  views  the  anisotropy  of  light
propagation is not a feature of light “itself” but of the underlying mathematical space (see, e.g., Budden
1997; Ungar 1986).  In  the case of special  relativity we would not have anymore a spatial  Euclidean
geometry corresponding to the four-dimensional Minkowski space-time. Due to the anisotropy of the
three-dimensional space we would have a Finsler space-time. This would make the conventionality of the
one-way  speed  of  light  (or  equivalently  the  conventionality  of  distant  simultaneity)  a  case  of  the
conventionality of (spatial) geometry,  to be addressed as such. Einstein’s view that implies taking the
spatial Euclidean geometry to be the physical spatial geometry of the theory excludes taking the choice of
a  Finsler  geometry  as  a  possible  conventional  choice  of  the  geometry,  even  if  it  turns  out  to  be
mathematically an option in the case of special relativity. Taking for granted that this might be done, its
justification would not arise as a possible conventional choice but, e.g., to enable to take into account
eventual observable anisotropic phenomena corresponding to a violation of Lorentz invariance (see, e.g.,
Bogoslovsky 2006). Ultimately, this would imply a change of special relativity. 
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Winnie (1970) and Giannoni (1978). Edwards (1963) obtained the generalized Lorentz
transformations  for  the  case  of  anisotropic  Minkowski  space-times,  Winnie  (1970)
generalized the kinematics of special relativity for the case of anisotropic Minkowski
space-times, and Giannoni (1978) developed a generalization of relativistic dynamics
and electrodynamics also for the case of anisotropic Minkowski space-times. Giannoni
showed, in particular,  that a generalization of Maxwell-Lorentz equations is possible
that is consistent with the anisotropic Minkowski space-time and its corresponding one-
way speeds of light. To simplify let us say that we have a one-way speed of light c+  in
the positive direction of the x-axis  and a one-way speed of light  c– in  the negative
direction of the x-axis, as determined by the adopted anisotropic Minkowski space-time
<E4,  η'>  =  〈E4,  d*η〉.  Giannoni  showed  that,  while  isotropic  electrodynamics  has
solutions corresponding to a plane wave traveling in free space with a speed c in any
direction, anisotropic electrodynamics predicts a wave traveling in the positive direction
of the x-axis with a speed of c+ and a wave traveling in the negative direction of the x-
axis  with  a  speed  of  c– (Giannoni  1978,  33-8).  The  anisotropic  electrodynamics  is
consistent  with  the  anisotropic  Minkowski  space-time,  and  they  are  physically
equivalent to the isotropic formulation, i.e. Ganisotropic + Panisotropic = Gisotropic + Pisotropic.
This means that depending on the particular Minkowskian geometry adopted, one
also  adopts  a  particular  formulation  of  electrodynamics,  the  “standard”  isotropic
electrodynamics, or an anisotropic electrodynamics. What we have then, when adopting
a  gauge  interpretation  of  the  conventionality  of  distant  simultaneity,  is  a  case  of
Einstein’s version of the conventionality of geometry. In one case we have the standard
metric  corresponding to  an isotropic light  speed described by the standard isotropic
electrodynamics (Gisotropic + Pisotropic); in the other case we have a non-standard anisotropic
Minkowskian geometry with an anisotropic electrodynamics (Ganisotropic + Panisotropic ).21 
4. Einstein’s physical geometry and the non-conventionality of the Minkowski space-
time
It  seems that  we are facing a limitation in Einstein’s  view of geometry as physical
geometry.  According to  Einstein  we can adopt  the  spatial  Euclidean  geometry as  a
physical  geometry.  Also  we  can  make  a  similar  case  regarding  the  congruence  of
successive  time  intervals  (associated  to  any  clock  at  any  location  in  the  inertial
reference frame). This means taking time to be uniform. However, we still have left out
the definition of a global time coordinate in the inertial reference frame for which it is
necessary  to  synchronize  the  clocks.  It  is  here  that  we  would  find  an  element  of
conventionality due to the physical equivalence of diffeomorphically related Minkowski
space-times. The exact definition of the light cone structure would be stipulated in terms
of a particular (conventional) gauge choice. In this way the chronogeometry of space-
time would not be a completely physical chronogeometry.   
This might not be the case. As it is well-known there is a “tradition” that goes as far
as 1910 when Ignatowski proposed a deduction of the Lorentz transformations relying
only on the principle of relativity and other assumptions but not on electrodynamics
(see, e.g., Brown 2005, 105-6). This type of approach has been presented, with some
21  It is not the purpose of this work to engage directly in the issue of the conventionality of simultaneity.
In this way we will not address aspects like, e.g., simultaneity as an invariant equivalence on space-time,
or the uniqueness of Einstein’s standard simultaneity (see, e.g., Janis 2014). The only objective of this
section is to show that Rynasiewicz’s view of the conventionality of simultaneity (conventionality of the
one-way speed of light) in terms of a gauge freedom in the choice between diffeomorphically related
space-times can also be seen as an example of Einstein’s conventionality of geometry.
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variations, by different authors (see, e.g., Schwartz 1962; Levy-Leblond 1976; Mermin
1984). Its main virtues would be: (1) independence from electrodynamics, (2) showing
that  Galilean  and Lorentz  transformations  are  the  only  options  compatible  with  the
principle of relativity.
In all cases one starts with the notion of inertial reference frame and then considers
several other assumptions. The most important are: (1) the principle of relativity, (2) the
homogeneity  of  space  and time,   (3)  the  isotropy of  space.  There  is  an  agreement
regarding the necessity of these assumptions but there are differences regarding other
possible assumptions and on important details.22 
In this type of approach, it is considered that from the notion of inertial reference
frame plus  this  set  of  assumptions  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  general  transformation
functions  relating  the  coordinate  systems  of  two  inertial  reference  frames.  These
functions depend on a constant K (with the dimension of the inverse of the velocity, i.e.
[K] = m–1 s). If K is set to zero one arrives at the Galilean transformations. If K is taken
to be positive, one arrives at the Lorentz transformations. The decision between the two
possibilities  can  be  made  by  reference  to  physical  phenomena,  in  particular  the
existence or not of a limiting velocity (see, e.g., Lee and Kalotas 1975, 436). 
With a few exceptions (see, e.g., Mermin 1984, 124 endnote 5; Feingebaum 2008,
15;  Schwartz  1962,  698),  proponents  of  this  approach do not  take  into account  the
setting of the coordinate time, which in Einstein’s approach is made by considering the
synchronization of clocks. Since, in this case, the coordinate time is established without
any reference to the light postulate, then the synchronization of clocks must be made
without resort to light. We are deducing the inertial relativistic transformations in the
general form between two inertial reference frames in relative motion, previous to the
determination of what are the actual transformations that one must adopt, Galilean or
Lorentzian. In this way the synchronization must be independent from electrodynamics
and also compatible with classical mechanics and special relativity. 
One example of a synchronization procedure independent of the exchange of light
that seems to fit this requirement was proposed by Feigenbaum (2008, 15). It is based
on the inertial motion of free bodies and the Euclidean nature of space (in particular the
isotropy  of  space).  One  takes  two  identical  bodies  compressing  a  spring,  located
midway between two identical clocks. To simplify one can consider that the clocks are
disconnected with an initial phase set to zero. When released the two bodies will move
inertially in opposite directions, traveling equal distances at equal times. This means
that they will arrive, each one, at each of the clocks at the same time. The clocks are
turned on when the bodies arrive, in this way being synchronized with the same phase. 
To  synchronize  another  clock,  one  considers  again  a  pair  of  identical  bodies
compressing a spring located midway between the clock to be synchronized and a clock
of the pair already synchronized. Let us consider that initially the clock has its phase set
to zero and is turned off, and is set on upon arrival of the material body. The material
22  According to  different  authors there  would be different  assumptions at  play.  For  example Levy-
Leblond  (1976)  considers  that  the  group  structure  of  the  set  of  all  transformations  between  inertial
reference frames is implicit in the definition of inertial reference frame when taking into account the
“basic”  assumptions.  Sardelis  (1982),  on  the  other  hand,  considers  the  group  structure  as  an  extra
assumption. Mermin (1984) focus on the smoothness of the transformation as a mathematical assumption.
Feigenbaum (2008) takes the existence of a space-time point relationship to be mandatory.  Berzi and
Gorini  (1969)  consider  that  taking  the  transformation  functions  to  be  real  and  continuous  is  a
mathematical assumption. Baccetti, Tate, and Visser (2012) consider the description of space and time
using  real  numbers  as  an  assumption.  Levy-Leblond  (1976)  also  calls  the  attention  to  a  causality
assumption related to the notion of flow of time, differentiating clearly time from space. According to
him, this is fundamental to reject mathematically possible transformations that physically would entail,
e.g., the possibility of interchanging time with space.
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bodies are released and one records the time of arrival to the clock of the synchronized
pair. Let us say, e.g., that the clock reads 22s. Since the clocks have the same rate, the
difference of the time readings, i.e. their phase difference, will always be 22 – 0 = 22s.
One simply has to advance the time reading of the clock being synchronized by 22s to
synchronize it with the other clocks (of the pair already synchronized). By repeating this
procedure with all the clocks of the inertial reference frame one synchronizes all the
clocks.  In  this  way  we  could  implement  a  synchronization  procedure  without  any
reference to light. 
We  must  take  into  account  that  in  his  synchronization  procedure,  Feigenbaum
makes reference to the law of inertia in its “standard” formulation.  If it turns out that
the synchronization is related to a conventional element in the mathematical structure
of the theory (G), then, according to Einstein’s views, the physical part (P), including
the law of inertia, might be affected by the implementation of a different Gnew due to the
adoption  of  a  different  synchronization  procedure.  This  implies  that  the  exact
formulation  of the law of inertia  might  depend on the particularities  of the adopted
synchronization procedure, and that there is an eventual problem of circularity in this
approach. As we will just see with a small  change in Feigenbaum’s synchronization
procedure it is possible to avoid any eventual conventionality in the synchronization of
distant clocks.
Instead  of  considering  the  synchronization  in  terms  of  inertial  material  bodies
making reference to the law of inertia (which might imply some conventional element
due to the application  of the law of  inertia  in  its  standard form previous  to having
synchronized clocks), we will consider atomic clocks in inertial motion.23
For  our  synchronization  procedure  instead  of  just  one  spring  we  will  use  two
identical springs, attached to each other (we basically take the spring of Feigenbaum’s
procedure as being a “composite” of two identical springs). How can we make sure that
the  two  springs  are  identical  without  resort  to  dynamical  notions  that  can  only  be
formalized  after  defining  a  coordinate  time  (i.e.  after  completing  the  setting  of  the
Minkowski space-time)? Let us consider the following gedanken experiment.  Let us
consider two springs attached to the origin O of our inertial reference frame, side by
side, along the same direction. We have two identical atomic clocks compressing each
spring.  We  release  the  two  springs  at  the  same  time  (as  given  by  a  clock  at  O),
jettisoning the two atomic clocks. We check if they arrive at a particular point at the
same time (as given by the time readings of both clocks). If this is the case then the two
springs are identical. Here we do not have to worry about the state of motion of the
clocks; it could even be non-inertial. For our purpose it is enough that they remain side
23  As mentioned in footnote 6, we can have a notion of inertial motion or motion of a free body previous
to the completion of the law of inertial (in this way avoiding any reference, at this point, to the uniformity
of  time).  We  defended  the  view  that  the  use  of  the  notion  of  “free  body”  at  this  point  of  the
“reconstruction” of special relativity is not inconsistent. Also we want to call the attention to the fact that
this  notion  is  implicit  in  the  assumption  of  transportable  rods and  clocks  (independent  of  their  past
history).  The rods and clocks are taken not to interact with each other, neither, e.g., with an extended
material body constituting an inertial frame: they are isolated physical systems. If we have an inertial
reference frame made up of a grid of rods and clocks and we have an electromagnetic field, this field
cannot affect the rods and clocks of the reference frame, otherwise we would consider space-time to be
curved. The rods and clocks are not strictly free bodies only when being moved (e.g.,  by applying a
“contact” force). However, the “independence from past history” guaranties that the length of the rods
and the rate of the clocks are not affected during transport  from an inertial  state into another.  If  we
consider that we boost a clock into a state of (inertial) motion in relation to an adopted inertial reference
frame, as in the case of the synchronization procedure we are considering, its rate is the same as that of
the clocks “at rest” in the frame (i.e. they all have the same proper time. See footnote 25), and we can
consider that it is a free body in inertial motion in relation to the inertial reference frame.
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by side. That the springs behave in a reliable and regular way can be confirmed by
repeated  experiments.  This  procedure  gives  us  assurance  that  the  springs  behave
identically  without  any  resort  to  formal  notions  like,  e.g.,  the  conservation  of
momentum.
Let us consider two atomic clocks compressing two identical springs attached to
each  other  at  the  origin  O  (located  midway  between  two  clocks  A  and  B  to  be
synchronized). The springs are placed along the line connecting A and B, one of them in
the direction OA, the other in the direction OB. All the clocks are initially turned off.
Upon releasing,  the atomic clocks are set on. We find out that when arriving at the
clocks to be synchronized, the atomic clocks read the same time. The clocks at rest in
the inertial reference frame are turned on when the atomic clocks arrive, in this way
being synchronized with the same phase. The identical time interval measured by the
atomic  clocks  in  inertial  motion  is  taken  to  be  non-conventional,  since  we  are
considering the atomic time to be uniform in a non-conventional way (i.e. as a physical
uniform time).  This  implies  that  when  turning  on  the  clocks  at  rest  in  the  inertial
reference  frame  (i.e.  when  synchronizing  the  clocks)  this  is  made  without  any
conventional element at play. In this approach the “uniformity” of the inertial motion
(i.e.  the  standard  formulation  of  the  law  of  inertia)  results  from  a  non-circular
synchronization  procedure  in  which  the  physical  uniform time  of  atomic  clocks  in
inertial motion is the only relevant element taken into account.24 The other clocks of the
inertial reference frame are set in phase with this pair of synchronized clocks following
Feigenbaum’s procedure described above, using atomic clocks as our inertial  bodies
(and  using  two  attached  identical  springs).  In  this  way,  we  avoid  any  possible
circularity. 
Let  us  look  at  this  approach  a  little  more.  As  it  is,  just  looking  at  the
synchronization of A and B we might be facing a circular argument. It seems that we
are saying that the pair of atomic clocks jettisoned by the two attached springs can be
seen as traveling equal distances with equal velocities in a given inertial reference frame
where A and B are at  rest.  We would be falling in the trap of a circular  argument.
However, this is not what is being said here. We still do not have any notion of velocity,
neither a coordinate time defined in the inertial reference frame. The clocks released
from the springs travel equal distances because, e.g., with two identical rods we located
the two attached springs midway between A and B (at the origin O). We accept that the
distances are equal when we accept Einstein’s views on physical geometry – it is not, so
to speak, a metaphysically neutral position. The same goes with the time reading of the
atomic clocks jettisoned by the springs. When they arrive at A and B they have the same
time reading25 (as we can check “experimentally”), but it is the supposition of the non-
24  We presuppose that the clocks undergo an inertial motion from O to A and from O to B. That this
motion is of the “same kind” can be further checked by the time reading of the clocks when arriving at A
and B. If they are the same we are confident that we have an inertial motion. At this point a “skeptic”
might consider that, e.g., a “little devil” created some sort of field or applied forces that affected both
clocks identically,  for example by accelerating them in the same way, so that in fact while they both
moved rectilinearly along the line connecting A to B, and gave the same time reading, they were not
actually in an inertial motion. This would not be a problem since their non-inertial motion would have
been equivalent as confirmed by their identical time reading at A and B. The important thing is that the
atomic clocks in motion from O to A and from O to B carry the same (non-conventional) atomic time to
A and B. In this case we do not have yet the notion of the Minkowski proper time of an accelerated clock.
However, we do know that if the experiment was made in a context where the clocks move inertially their
time reading would be uniform; any (direct or indirect) effect of the acceleration on the rate of clocks
might affect this uniformity but not the non-conventional character of it.
25  Throughout this paper when referring to the time reading of atomic clocks we are considering what we
might call their empirical proper time, which, it turns out, has the same value as their Minkowski proper
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conventionality of the (uniform) atomic time, applied independently to each clock, that
enables  us  to  consider  that  the  time  reading  (and  the  way  time  “unfolded”)   is
“physically”  the same for each atomic clock when reaching A and B – both atomic
clocks “carry” exactly the same physical time to A and B, i.e. they go through the same
“intra-atomic phenomena”.26 From this we conclude that A and B are turned on at the
same (physical) time, i.e., that they are in synchrony (and since they are atomic clocks
they will “unfold” the same physical uniform time). 
Before  considering  the  rest  of  the  synchronization  procedure  let  us  see  the
implication of the synchrony of A and B in relation to the one-way speed of light. As it
is we have already defined a sort of metrological unit of equal-time-at-a-distance with
the synchrony of the clocks A and B. If we send light from A to B and from B to A
when both clocks have the same time reading, the light pulses will arrive at B and A
with the clocks having again an identical time reading. This implies the isotropy of the
one-way speed of light. This result might seem suspicious because it is well-known that
time  and  time  again  there  have  been  propositions  of  experimental  approaches  (or
thought experiments) taken to measure the one-way speed of light that are circular or
depend on non-trivial  assumptions  (see,  e.g.,  Salmon 1977;  Anderson, Vetharaniam,
and Stedman, 1998; Jammer 2006; Janis 2014). We do not have this type of situation
here. The one-way speed of light is taken to be isotropic conditioned to accepting a
physical Euclidean space and a physical uniform time, and only in this case. It depends
on adopting a particular philosophy of geometry (chronogeometry). In this way we do
not  contradict,  e.g.,  Salmon  conclusion  regarding  the  possibility  of  convention-free
methods:  “the evidence,  thus far,  favours those who have claimed that  the one-way
speed of light unavoidably involves a non-trivial conventional element” (Salmon 1977
288). Strictly speaking we do not have conventional elements, but we do have the non-
trivial  strong  philosophical  presupposition  of  a  physical  space  congruence  and  a
physical time congruence. 
It might still be the case that we have some non-trivial assumption that undermines
the case being made here. In fact Salmon (1977, 273-4) criticizes a very similar method
in which two objects are set  into motion  (in relation to the points A and B) by an
explosion. Salmon questions the triviality of the symmetry of this procedure (similar to
the symmetry in the release by the two attached springs), since according to him we are
taking into account the conservation of momentum. This needs the “backing”,  so to
speak, of the whole theory that is supposed to be built on top of the notion of inertial
coordinate  system with  its  conventional  distant  simultaneity.  It  would  be  a  circular
procedure after all. That is not the case of the procedure being considered here, due to
the strong stance on a physical space and time congruences and associated notions of
transportable  identical  rods  and  transportable  identical  clocks.  We do not  need any
theory of the springs or whatever mechanism that enables a symmetrical release of the
two clocks.  If we take the length and time interval to be physical we can leave finding
springs or some mechanism that enables the symmetrical release of the clocks to the
practical implementation of an experimental procedure. There is no need of a theoretical
framework for that. If the two clocks do not read the same physical time when arriving
each at each of the points A and B (that are at the same physical distance from the mid-
point  where  the  clocks  are  released)  then  the  springs  or  mechanism  is  not  well
time (after we have defined this notion). See, e.g., Brown (2005, 29 and 115); Arthur (2007, 16); Arthur
(2010); Bacelar Valente (2016).
26  It  is this assertion that enables us to consider,  as an afterthought,  that both clocks have the same
velocity as measured by themselves.
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implemented and we have to improve it. We do not need any formalized notion, e.g., of
momentum or force at this point.
Returning to the issue of the setting of time in an inertial reference frame, let us
consider the synchronization of the other clocks with A and B. Let us consider another
clock C. Using rods we locate two attached identical springs (with an atomic clock at
the extremity of each spring) midway between, e.g., C and A.27 The atomic clocks are
turned on when released by the springs. When they arrive at C and A, C is turned on and
the time reading of A is registered. At this moment there is a phase difference between
the time reading of C and A. let us say, e.g., that C reads 0 and A reads 22s. C will be in
synchrony with A (and B) when we adjust the time reading tC of C to tC = tC + 22. It is
important to notice that we are not setting the time of C to the reading of the atomic
clock that arrives at C.  The atomic clocks are moving relative to A and C, and as we
know they experience a time dilation. If we synchronize C with the “moving” atomic
clock and then we apply the same procedure to check the synchrony of C and B we
would find that they are not in synchrony, i.e. the synchronization approach would not
be transitive.  That does not happen in this case. With this approach C has the same
phase as B. We can check this again by releasing a pair of atomic clocks compressing
two attached identical springs located midway between C and B. When the clocks arrive
at C and B we register the time reading of C and B and confirm that they are the same.
When accepting that we have a Euclidean space and a uniform time it follows that
the  synchrony  of  clocks  is  also  non-conventional.  This  means  that  the  light  cone
structure is set in a non-conventional way.  In this way,  in Einstein’s approach,  the
chronogeometry of space-time can be taken to be a physical chronogeometry.28
5. Conclusions
When adopting Einstein’s view of geometry as a physical geometry we might expect
that the chronogeometry of special  relativity,  i.e.  the Minkowski space-time,  is non-
conventional.  Einstein  himself  mentioned  that  his  views  apply  to  the  case  of  the
“practical  geometry  of  Riemann”  (Einstein  1921a,  213).  However,  Einstein  did  not
address, in this respect, the issue of the conventionality of simultaneity. It turns out that
if  distant simultaneity is conventional then we cannot regard the chronogeometry as
physical in Einstein’s sense. In this work we have made the case that Einstein’s original
propositions related to the physical Euclidean space and the physical uniform time can
be  consistently  extended  to  the  whole  of  the  Minkowski  space-time.  For  this  it  is
necessary  to  show  that  it  is  possible  to  determine  the  coordinate  time  in  a  non-
conventional  way.  This  was  done  by  adopting  an  approach  similar  to  Einstein’s
synchronization procedure. Simply, instead of making reference to the light postulate,
the  synchronization  of  clocks  is  made  using  atomic  clocks  in  inertial  motion.  This
approach only relies on Einstein’s assumptions of a physical (spatial) Euclidean space
27  Here we follow Einstein’s approach in terms of a (macroscopic) grid of clocks (see, e.g., Einstein
1907, 255-6; Wheeler and Taylor 1963; 17-8). We take for granted that using rods we can find a midpoint
between any clocks of the grid. At this point we might even dispense with this synchronization approach
using the atomic clocks. Since we already have A and B in synchrony (our “unit” of distant synchrony),
and we take the one-way speed of  light  to be isotropic,  we can use light  to put the other  clocks in
synchrony using Einstein’s  synchronization procedure,  or  we simple choose A or  B as  our “master”
clock and use radar time (see, e.g., Bondi 1965, 93-7).
28  Being non-conventional the whole of the chronogeometry means that the physical structure is also non-
conventional. In particular, the law of inertia “codifies” the physical uniform time of the atomic time
scale and the inertial time scale.
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and a non-conventional uniform atomic time. This implies, when accepting Einstein’s
views, that the coordinate time is also non-conventional. From this it follows that the
Minkowski space-time is non-conventional.
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